Ranking Value and Preference: A Model of Superstardom by Harashima, Taiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Ranking Value and Preference: A Model
of Superstardom
Taiji Harashima
Kanazawa Seiryo University
20 October 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74626/
MPRA Paper No. 74626, posted 20 October 2016 11:34 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking Value and Preference: A Model of Superstardom 
 
 
 
Taiji Harashima* 
 
 
October 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Superstars earn extremely high incomes as compared with those of ordinary people, but why? In 
this paper, I present a model of superstardom that explains the mechanism of extremely high 
incomes based on the concepts of ranking value and ranking preference. I propose that goods and 
services possess not only practical values but also ranking values because people derive utility 
through various types of rankings. This emotional response (i.e., ranking preference) gives 
monopolistic powers to the producers of some types of goods or services. For some goods and 
services (e.g., professional sports), the ranking preference is very strong and therefore so is the 
level of monopolistic power. This strong monopolistic power is the origin of the extremely high 
incomes of superstars.   
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Superstars—for example, top athletes in professional sports, pop music stars, and best-selling 
authors—earn extremely high incomes as compared with those of ordinary people. In theory, 
wages are equal to marginal products of labor. The question that arises, then, is: Are superstars 
that earn extremely high incomes really extremely more productive? Indeed, the physical abilities 
of top athletes or other performers may very well be higher than those of ordinary people, but are 
they sufficiently high to explain the tremendous difference in incomes between superstars and 
ordinary people? Furthermore, even if, for example, an athlete (or any other performer) has 
physical ability that is very close to that of a superstar, he or she may generally not gain as high 
an income if he or she plays in a minor league or an unpopular sport.  
 Several models have been presented to explain why superstars are able to earn unusually 
high incomes. An early and important work on this topic was that of Rosen (1981), which was 
followed by those of Adler (1985), Frank and Cook (1995), and Borghans and Groot (1998). 
Rosen (1981) attributed the extremely high incomes of superstars to differences in talent (quality) 
and to a special market structure (i.e., “non-rivalry”). Adler (1985) discussed “consumption 
capital,” and Borghans and Groot (1998) “endogenous property rights” and monopolistic power. 
However, their models have problems (see Section 3). Frank and Cook (1995) and Borghans and 
Groot (1998) commonly emphasized people’s strong tendency to want to obtain the “best” or to 
observe the “winner,” but they have the common drawback that no mathematical model for the 
mechanism is presented. The aim of this study was to address this drawback and present an 
alternative model of income generation of superstars.  
 The essential element in people’s tendency to want to obtain the best or to view winners 
is related to the concept of ranking. With ranking, it is not the absolute performance that is 
important, but rather, it is the relative performance that is essential. People derive utility through 
various types of activities or products that involve ranking—for example, sport championships, 
Olympic competitions, or best-selling books. People are interested in many types of rankings in 
various aspects of their lives, and this intrinsic tendency has an influence on their behaviors with 
respect to economic activities. Hence, relative differences or rankings affect many aspects of 
economic activities. In this paper, this intrinsic nature of human beings is incorporated into the 
newly introduced concepts of “ranking value” and “ranking preference.” On the basis of these 
concepts, a model of superstardom is then constructed that explains the mechanism of why 
superstars can obtain extremely high incomes.  
 
2  RANKING VALUE AND PREFERENCE 
 
2.1  Ranking  
Ranking indicates an ordered list of relative standing. Indeed, the concept of relativity is essential 
in ranking. Even if the absolute abilities and performances of competitors are almost identical, 
only one person or group can be the best or the champion. Even if there is little difference in an 
absolute sense, there are significant differences in a relative sense because people will derive 
utility through various types of rankings in different aspects of life. On some occasions, people 
practically neglect the absolute performances and are interested only in the rankings. Therefore, 
both absolute and relative differences surely have an important influence on people’s thoughts 
and activities. 
 In general, absolute terms are used in economic studies. Even though ordinal utility is 
conceptually important, cardinal utility is assumed in most studies. Therefore, the concept of 
ranking or relativity has not typically been seen as an important element in economics. However, 
because people are interested in rankings and relative differences, these factors will affect many 
aspects of economic activity.  
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2.2  Ranking value and preference 
2.2.1  Practical value and ranking value 
Value is regarded as reflecting something useful. In this paper, it is assumed that there are two 
kinds of value: practical value and ranking value. Practical value is the value that people feel 
when consuming a good or service for practical purposes. Ranking value is the value that people 
feel from the rank of a good or service in a set of similar types of goods or services that people 
use, possess, or observe. Ranking value, therefore, is the value people place on goods or services 
on the basis of their rank (e.g., the ranking of a book in a best-seller list or that of a professional 
baseball team in a league). For example, people will buy a book not only because of its practical 
usefulness but also because of its popularity. That is, a book can have value not only on the basis 
of its practical usefulness (its practical value) but also on the basis of its popularity (its ranking 
value).  
 In many cases, practical value may be almost identical to the usual sense of value. If a 
good or service is more practically useful than another good or service, it has a higher practical 
value. People obtain utility from practical value through the consumption of goods and services. 
On the other hand, ranking value does not require practical usefulness. Even if a good or service 
is not practically useful, it can still have ranking value if it possesses a ranking: an example is the 
price of a curio that is not practically useful but is evaluated to be the best among a set of similar 
types of curios. If the rank of a good or service is higher than those of others in the set, its ranking 
value is higher. People obtain utility from ranking value through the consumption (use, possession, 
or observation) of goods and services. 
 For example, many people like to watch professional sports, even though watching them 
may be of little practical value. A sense of enthusiasm and fun is generated when viewing 
professional sports, but such emotions may not reflect any practical usefulness. Although the 
emotions generated may not be practically useful, the desire to watch, witness, and immediately 
know the winner (i.e., the best or the champion) provides ranking value. Although some people 
may want to see a game because they enjoy watching the performance (similar to watching a 
circus act), most people watch professional sports to watch, witness, and immediately know who 
wins: that is, they want to feel the sense of ranking and consume ranking value. People thereby 
obtain utility from the sense of ranking. I call people’s preference for ranking value a “ranking 
preference.” A mathematical expression of ranking preference is presented in Section 3.  
 
2.2.2  The origin of ranking value and preference 
If ranking preference is a deep parameter of human behavior, it will be deeply rooted in the 
process of evolution of human beings; that is, it will be closely related to survival in the long 
history of humans. I propose the following two fundamental desires as the roots of ranking 
preference.   
 
(1) Desire to win a struggle, conflict, or war 
Struggles and conflicts are fundamental elements in life. In social species, they occur not only 
between individuals but also between rival groups. Struggles and conflicts generate intense 
emotions, including a strong desire to win. In an evolutionary sense, winning or losing a struggle 
or conflict was often a matter of life and death. Hence, people are very excited by struggles and 
conflicts. Interestingly, people may be excited by the occurrence of struggle or conflict itself, 
regardless of the eventual outcome. People therefore may “demand” the excitement of struggle, 
conflict, and even war (James, 1910; Cannon, 1915). If a particular group wins, the people in that 
group will be happy and comfortable (i.e., obtain utility). It is likely that humans have evolved to 
be excited by the occurrence of struggle or conflict because this response is important for their 
survival. Therefore, people have evolved to obtain utility from the occurrence of struggle or 
conflict regardless of whether they are actually involved in the conflict itself.  
 An important nature of struggle and conflict is that, regardless of the quality of 
performances in the struggle or conflict, a win is a win. Absolute performances in struggles or 
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conflicts are basically meaningless, whereas relative performances are vitally important. For 
example, in a horse race, the winning time is basically meaningless, but the order of finish is 
valuable. If they are relatively superior, people can win even if the difference in the performances 
is very slight. That is, people are happy not only because they are strong but also because they are 
stronger, and they are happy when they are the strongest. As a result, rankings generate strong 
emotions in people’s minds. These emotions are among the origins of ranking value and 
preference.  
 
(2) Desire to behave in accordance with dominance hierarchy 
Many species—particularly social species—have dominance hierarchies (see, e.g., Landau, 1951; 
Bayly et al., 2006). Most primates, including humans, have hierarchical societies. Dominance 
hierarchy has evolved to be deeply integrated into primate societal behaviors by necessity. Under 
dominance hierarchy, an individual’s rank in its group is crucial. Knowing one’s own rank and 
the rank of others is a significantly important part of living in a societal group.  
 Because life strategies in a societal group vary depending on an individual’s rank, 
individuals must constantly reconfirm their rank. If individuals are unable to confirm their ranks, 
they may face adverse outcomes or even death. This confirmatory need may be accompanied by 
subordinate behaviors such as admiring, supporting, and following the leader and punishing 
members who neglect the ranking.  
 Therefore, it is likely that humans have evolved to possess the emotion or urge to 
regularly reconfirm rankings. In other words, people have evolved to obtain utility from regularly 
reconfirming ranking orders within groups. Conversely, people will be very uneasy and 
uncomfortable if they are unable to correctly assess the latest rankings. Only after they reconfirm 
rankings will they feel at ease and comfortable and be satisfied. It is likely that this intrinsic 
emotion is another origin of ranking value and preference. 
 
2.2.3  Importance of ranking 
The emotions that underlie ranking value and preference will clearly surface on various occasions. 
Sports have been often seen as a substitute for war (Santayana, 1972: Fischer, 2002). Watching 
professional sports satisfies people’s desires and makes them feel comfortable because the games 
substitute for struggle, conflict, and war. Fans of a specific team may view the team as a substitute 
for the mother country or tribe in a war. People often form attachments to a specific sports team 
and maintain allegiance to it as if it gives them a sense of tribal unity. Another example of this 
emotion is in people’s responses to titles in the business world. A title indicates the rank of a 
person in a company, organization, or group. Whatever the true quality of performance of any 
given person, people evaluate and judge that person on the basis of the title to some extent. The 
quality of performance is of course important, but the title (rank) is also important. 
 Ranking is therefore an important element in people’s lives and economic activities. For 
some goods or service, people may even place higher values on rank than on practical use. It is 
highly likely that humans are intrinsically equipped with emotions that respond to various types 
of ranking. Therefore, if people do not sufficiently consider rankings in their daily activities, they 
may not be successful in managing their lives.  
 
2.3  Difference between positional goods and ranking value 
The concept of ranking value and preference may be seen as the same as that of positional goods 
(Frank, 1985, 1991; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). Indeed, both concepts are superficially 
similar in the sense that both emphasize the importance of relativity in people’s behaviors. 
However, there is an important difference between the two concepts. The essential nature of 
positional goods is that people demand positional goods for the purpose of seeking status—that 
is, because they can feel and be seen as special, or in particular superior to other people. This 
means that, with the concept of positional goods, it is the rankings of consumers (users, buyers, 
or owners) and not of goods and services that are of importance because consumers of positional 
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goods are pursuing status.  
 On the other hand, it is the rankings of goods and services that are of importance with 
the concepts of ranking value and preference, and consumers are basically indifferent to their own 
relative status. For example, people do not watch professional sports to seek enhanced status. 
Rather, they obtain utility by consuming ranking value even if it does not change their status. In 
essence, the theory of positional goods reflects the rankings of consumers, whereas that of ranking 
value and preference reflects the rankings of goods or services. The emotions or desires of people 
in these systems are therefore completely different. The concept of positional goods is useful 
when studying luxury goods and services, but it is not when examining the incomes of superstars.  
 
3  A MODEL OF SUPERSTARDOM 
 
3.1  Background 
As noted in the Introduction, Rosen (1981) performed early and important work on the model of 
superstardom. He attributed the extremely high incomes of superstars to a special market structure 
(i.e., “non-rivalry”). However, Adler (2006) criticized Rosen (1981) by arguing that non-rivalry 
results in very low prices, thus suggesting that superstars would actually be poor. Adler (1985) 
presented a different model and argued that the extremely high incomes of superstars can be 
attributed to what he called consumption capital. However, the assumption of increasing marginal 
utility in his model is not easily acceptable. Borghans and Groot (1998) presented a model based 
on the argument of Frank and Cook (1995). They argued that the extremely high incomes of 
superstars are attributable to “endogenous property rights” and the monopolistic power that these 
rights generate, because people have a strong tendency to want to watch the performance of 
someone known to be the best. Frank and Cook (1995) argued that, in modern economies, the 
winner takes all of the money in many industries. However, the argument of Frank and Cook 
(1995) is strictly narrative and lacks a theoretical model that clearly explains why the winner takes 
all. The model of Borghans and Groot (1998) suffers from the same drawback, because the 
mechanism used to explain people’s strong tendency to want to watch the winner, the best, or the 
champion is not sufficiently developed and is at best only suggested.  
 The concept of ranking value and preference discussed in Section 2 is, however, closely 
related to the arguments of Frank and Cook (1995) and Borghans and Groot (1998), because they 
commonly emphasize that household consumption is influenced by both absolute and relative 
performances or qualities.  
 
3.2  The model of superstardom 
3.2.1  The model  
Goods and services have three properties: quantity, quality, and ranking. Quality is related to 
practical value, and ranking is related to ranking value. Quantity is related to both values. Suppose 
that the quality and ranking of each good or service are given exogenously and fixed. Here, for 
simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of good or service in the economy, and that all 
goods or services belong to this type (these goods or services are hereafter called “goods”) and 
are substitutable for each other for households’ practical uses. Although the goods are 
substitutable from the point of view of practical uses, they are differentiated from the point of 
view of ranking. 
 Let R (= 1, 2, 3, …) be the rank of the goods. Goods with rank R = 1 are those most 
preferred by households. R = 2 indicates the next most preferred, and so on. It is assumed for 
simplicity that there is no tied rank. A household’s utility derived from consuming the goods with 
rank R is  
 
 Rqqu RlRn ,, ,,  
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where qn,R and ql,R are the quantity and quality of the goods with rank R, respectively. For 
simplicity, the utility of the household is modified to  
 
 Rqu R ,
~  
 
where
Rq
~ is the “quality-adjusted quantity” of the goods with rank R, and
l,Rn,RR qqq 
~ . The use 
of quality-adjusted quantity is based on the assumption that, given a standard (reference) quality 
of the goods, consuming α% worse/better quality goods than the standard quality goods for 
practical use is equivalent to consuming α% more/less of these goods than the standard quality 
goods for practical use. The quality-adjusted quantity
Rq
~ therefore indicates the “real” quantity 
of the goods standardized by a reference quality. 
 The utility function has the following conventional characteristics: 
 
 
0~
~



R
R
q
,Rqu
 
 
and 
 
  
 
0~
~
2
2



R
R
q
,Rqu
 . 
 
In addition, for ranking preference, the following characteristics are assumed. For any Rr ,  
 
   ,rqu,rqu rr
~1~                             (1) 
 
and 
 
       ,rqu,rqu,rqu,rqu rrrr
~1~1~2~   .                (2) 
 
Inequality (1) indicates that, as rank becomes lower (R increases), utility decreases, and inequality 
(2) indicates that, as rank becomes lower (R increases), the magnitude of decrease in utility with 
a lowering in rank decreases.  
 It is assumed, furthermore, for simplicity that utilities are separable. Therefore, a 
household’s total utility derived from its consumption of goods of various ranks is described as  
 
   



1
~~
R
RRankQuant ,RququU                        (3) 
 
where uQuant (∙) and uRank (∙) are the utility function for consumption of practical value and that of 
ranking value, respectively, and 
 
  



1
~~
R
Rqq  . 
 
Similarly, the following conventional characteristics of the utility function are assumed: 
 
 
0


q~
q~uQuant  
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 
0
2
2



q~
q~uQuant  
 
 
0~
~



R
RRank
q
,Rqu
 
 
and 
 
  
 
0~
~
2
2



R
RRank
q
,Rqu
 . 
 
In addition, with respect to ranking preference, the following characteristics are assumed. For any
Rr ,  
 
   ,rqu,rqu rRankrRank
~1~                          (4) 
 
and 
 
       ,rqu,rqu,rqu,rqu rRankrRankrRankrRank
~1~1~2~   .          (5) 
 
 The budget constraint of households is  
 








111
~~~~
R
RRRank,Quant
R
RRRank,
R
RQuant qpqpqpqpI              (6) 
 
where I is the budget (income) of the household and is exogenously given and constant,
Quantp is 
the price of a unit of
Rq
~ consumed for practical value, and pRank,R is the price of a unit of Rq
~
consumed for ranking value. The price for practical value is identical for any R, qn,R, and ql,R. 
Equation (6) indicates that there is not only a price for ranking value but also a price for practical 
value, and households pay for both practical values and ranking values when they buy the goods. 
A household maximizes its utility (equation [3]) subject to the budget constraint (equation [6]). 
 On the other hand, the producer of the goods with rank R behaves to maximize its profits. 
For simplicity, costs to produce the goods are assumed to be directly proportional to
Rq
~ and 
identical for any R, qn,R, and ql,R. Let c be the cost per one unit of Rq
~ . Therefore, the profit of the 
producer of the goods with rank R (ΠR) is 
 
RRRRRank,RQuantR cq
~cq~pq~pΠ                      (7) 
 
where
Rc is the fixed cost of the producer of goods with rank R. 
 
3.2.2  The model with continuous ranking 
Ranks are discrete by nature. However, for simplicity, it is assumed that rank is continuous. Let 
R be [0,1) . The utility of a household is therefore changed to  
 
   
1
0
~~ dR,RququU RRankQuant                       (8) 
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where 
1
0
~~ dRqq R . The budget constraint of a household is changed to  
 
dRqpqpI RRRank,Quant 
1
0
~~  
 
Inequalities (1), (2), (4), and (5) are changed respectively to  
 
 
0
~



R
,Rqu R  ,                            (9) 
 
  
 
0
~
2
2



R
,Rqu R  , 
 
 
0
~



R
,Rqu RRank  ,                         (10) 
 
and 
 
  
 
0
~
2
2



R
,Rqu RRank  . 
 
3.3  The mechanism of superstardom 
3.3.1  Extremely high incomes of superstars 
3.3.1.1  Monopolistic power 
Ranking value and preference provide monopolistic powers to the producers of the goods because 
selling ranking value to consumers requires no additional cost, i.e., the marginal cost of producing 
a ranking value is zero, and thereby producers can set PRank,R above the marginal cost. Thanks to 
their monopolistic powers, producers are not price-takers. Rather, they can strategically set their 
prices for rank pRank,R in equation (7) so as to maximize their profits Πr. Rq
~ and pRank,R are 
therefore determined by producers’ strategic behaviors.  
 
3.3.1.2  The shape of the utility function 
The shape of the utility function with regard to ranking (
Ranku ) is important in determining the 
magnitude of the producers’ monopolistic power. Depending on the values of
 
R
,Rqu RRank

 ~
in 
inequality (10), utility functions can take various shapes, and the strength of monopolistic power 
depends on inequality (10) (or inequality [4]). As ranking preference becomes stronger—that is, 
as the values of
 
R
,Rqu RRank

 ~
become larger for any R—a household is willing to buy the goods 
for a higher price pRank,R than it did before. This means that, if a household’s ranking preference 
becomes stronger, the monopolistic powers of the producers become stronger, and the producers 
of the higher-ranked goods can set even higher prices.  
 Inequalities (9) and (10) (or inequalities [1] and [4]) indicate that
jRank,iRank, pp  if i < 
j where Rji , . The producer of the goods with rank 1 therefore has the strongest monopolistic 
power, and it can set the highest price (pRank,1) relative to the other producers. If the ranking 
preference is extremely strong, the producer of the goods with rank 1 will monopolize almost all 
revenues in the industry. 
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3.3.1.3  The strategy for non-rival goods and services 
Even if ranking preference is very strong, however, producers of the goods may not necessarily 
set high prices for ranking value (pRank,R). Instead of setting pRank,R high, they may plan to sell 
larger quantities by keeping pRank,R relatively low if monopolistic profits are maximized by doing 
so. Whether this strategy is adopted will depend on the degree of rivalry of the goods with respect 
to practical value. In the case of rival goods or services with respect to practical use, this low price 
strategy will not be adopted. However, in the case of non-rival goods or services (i.e., if very little 
cost is needed to produce and distribute additional units for practical use), then the strategy of 
setting relatively low prices for ranking value may be preferred.  
 In the case of non-rival goods or services, the marginal cost to produce not only ranking 
value but also practical value is almost zero. In this case, even if the price for the practical value 
is set relatively low, it is still above the marginal cost. That is, the supply curve of such goods (the 
marginal cost for practical value plus that for ranking value) will be situated at a very low price 
level and will be almost flat. On the other hand, lower prices will attract more consumers. If the 
demand curve is also almost flat in a low price range, the profits of the producer of the non-rival 
goods may be far larger when the strategy of setting a relatively low price for ranking value and 
thereby attracting a larger number of consumers is taken. That is, the maximum monopolistic 
profits may be realized when the price is set relatively low. This low price strategy is closely 
related to the argument presented by Rosen (1981).  
 
3.3.2  The two-producer model 
3.3.2.1  The model 
A two-producer version of the model is used in this section for simplicity to demonstrate the 
mechanism of superstardom. Suppose that there are only two producers: producers of goods with 
rank 1 and rank 2. Let them be producer 1 and producer 2, respectively. In addition, for simplicity, 
pQuant and uQuant are ignored. Hence, a household maximizes its utility 
 
   2~1~ 21 ,qu,quU RankRank   
 
subject to its budget constraint   
 
2211
~~ qpqpI Rank,Rank,   
 
where I, pRank,1, and pRank,2 are exogenously given. It is assumed that the ranking preference of the 
household is very strong—that is,    2~1~ 11 ,qu,qu RankRank  is very large. Hence, the indifference 
curve is almost horizontal (Figs. 1 and 2).  
 Producers 1 and 2 set their prices to maximize their profits, such that 
 
rrrRank,r qcqpΠ
~~   
 
for r = 1, 2.  
 
3.3.2.2  Equilibrium prices and quantities 
In the model with only two producers there is a duopoly. Suppose that producer 2 sets its price 
for ranking value pRank,2, and then, considering pRank,2, producer 1 sets its price for ranking value 
pRank,1 to maximize its profits. The quantities 1
~q and 2
~q are determined at the point of contact 
between an indifference curve and the household budget constraint (Fig. 1).  
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Figure 1: The case of a given PRank,2   
   
 
 
As pRank,1 is set higher, 1
~q decreases; that is, 0~
1
1



q
pRank, . Because producer 1 behaves to 
maximize its profits, it sets pRank,1 so as to satisfy 0~~~ 11
1
1
1
1 


 cpq
q
p
qd
dΠ
Rank,
Rank, ; that is, 
cq
q
p
cp
Rank,
Rank, 


 1
1
1
1
~
~
. An important point is that, because of very strong ranking 
preference and almost horizontal indifference curves, there is a range of pRank,1 where 21
~~ qq 
even if pRank,1 > pRank,2 (Fig. 1). That is, producer 1 can obtain far larger profits than producer 2.  
 However, because of the duopoly, game theoretic considerations apply. Producer 2 will 
change its price pRank,2 after recognizing producer 1’s price pRank,1 (Fig. 2). Each producer will 
adjust its prices for ranking value strategically by considering the other’s behavior. Most simply, 
pRank,1, pRank,2, 1
~q , and 2
~q will be determined at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Each producer has 
its own response function, which indicates the producer’s set of best strategies when a strategy of 
the other producer is given (i.e. its best prices for ranking value when the other’s price for ranking 
value is given). Response functions are depicted as response curves on the pRank,1 versus pRank,2 
plane in Figure 3. Equilibrium occurs at the point of intersection of the response curves. Note that 
neither producer sets its prices for ranking value below c because it would suffer losses by doing 
so (Fig. 3).  
Indifference curves 
for lower 
 PRank,1 
Budget constraint 
for higher PRank,1 
for higher 
PRank,1 
0 
 
Budget constraint 
for lower PRank,1 
for higher P
Rank, 1
 
 
for lower P
Rank, 1
 
1
~q  
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Figure 2: The case of a given PRank,1 
   
 
 
 The shapes of the response curves of producers 1 and 2 are very different because of the 
households’ very strong ranking preference—that is, because the indifference curve is almost 
horizontal. Because producer 1 can set significantly higher prices than producer 2, thanks to the 
very strong ranking preference, the response curve of producer 1 is situated at the upper side of 
the plane in Figure 3, whereas the response curve of producer 2 is situated at the left side of the 
plane. As a result, pRank,1 is notably higher than pRank,2 at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As the 
ranking preference increases, the response curve of producer 1 moves higher and that of producer 
2 moves farther left, and the difference between pRank,1 and pRank,2 at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
also increases. 
 Figure 3 indicates that, if ranking preference is strong, the equilibrium quantity of goods 
with rank 1 will not decrease largely even if producer 2 sets its price at pRank,2 = c (i.e., 02 Π ). 
This means that, if households’ ranking preference is strong enough, producer 2 must accept far 
smaller profits than producer 1 no matter which strategy producer 2 chooses. In other words, 
producer 1 can be a superstar. This is the mechanism of superstardom. 
 Note that producer 1 may set its price for ranking value (pRank,1) very low to expel 
producer 2 out of the market and completely monopolize the profits. However, if producer 2 is 
expelled and only producer 1 remains in the market, the ranking becomes meaningless for 
households and thereby the ranking value of the goods with rank 1 will be zero. Therefore, 
producer 1 will set its price for ranking value (pRank,1) sufficiently high so that producer 2 will not 
leave the market.  
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Figure 3: Cournot-Nash equilibrium under strong ranking 
preference  
  
 
3.4  Goods and services that can generate superstars 
3.4.1  Sports, art, and music industries 
Superstars are not observed in every industry; on the contrary, they exist in a limited number of 
industries (Frank and Cook, 1995). For many goods and services, practical value is far more 
important than ranking value. However, there are some goods and services that households feel 
are of little practical value but that have a large ranking value. Furthermore, there are goods or 
services that households feel have no practical value but have a huge ranking value (e.g., 
collectible items). If some people perceive a ranking value in a curio, it begins to possess a ranking 
value even though the item has little or no practical value. Whether a material that has little 
practical value becomes a desirable collectable item depends entirely on whether some people 
feel a sense of ranking value towards it. If no people feel the desire to rank it, it is basically trash. 
In any case, if ranking values are far more important than practical values, household demand 
will be determined mainly by ranking values. The phenomenon of superstardom can be vividly 
observed in such industries.  
 An example is professional sports, in which ranking value greatly overwhelms practical 
value. The practical value of watching a professional sporting event may be to see or generally 
Response curve of producer 2 
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0 
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p
Rank,1
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appreciate the high-quality performances of athletes. However, the main purpose of spectators of 
professional sports will be to witness and immediately know who wins. In this way, professional 
sporting events are completely different from, for example, a circus show that features mainly 
acrobatic events. Of course, if the quality of athletes’ performances in a game is low, spectators 
may be discontented with the game to some extent, but they will basically be satisfied with the 
game on the grounds that they can watch the game live. They obtain utility from feeling a sense 
of ranking or being immersed in the world of ranking. Hence, superstars can be generated in 
professional sport industries.   
 There are also gray-area goods and services—for example, art and music. In the 
industries of art and music, unlike in professional sports, there is no explicit game at which 
participants regularly compete. Of course, there are many competitions (particularly for young 
artists), but these represent only a small part of the art and music industries as a whole. Witnessing 
or knowing who “wins” a contest is not the main goal of consumers who buy art and music 
products. Practical value is undeniably important when a consumer buys such products: people 
purchase art and music products because they enjoy them. Nevertheless, ranking value is also 
important in these fields. There are few explicit and reliable rankings for many art and music 
products except, for example, hit charts in the music industry. Even so, people will still generally 
feel a sense of ranking, possibly even unconsciously, because they usually try to determine which 
products people are paying attention to, and they want to buy the products that are the most 
popular and well known. Fame is valuable because it provides information about implicit rankings 
and generates a sense of ranking. Even if a consumer makes the evaluation that the practical values 
and prices are the same between two paintings, he or she will generally buy the painting done by 
the more famous artist because the utility derived from the ranking value is greater. Therefore, 
although ranking value may be less important in the art and music industries than in professional 
sports, it is still relatively more important than it is in many other industries. Therefore, some 
artists may have great monopolistic powers: that is, superstars can be also generated in the art and 
music industries.   
 Note that, for ranking value to be important, the difference in abilities or qualities among 
contestants or competitors may have to be small. For example, if the differences in ability among 
teams within a professional sports league are very large, people may lose interest. Ranking is 
justified only when similar goods or services are compared. A large difference in abilities 
indicates that the good or service being contested belongs to a different category of goods or 
services. In this case, ranking value and ranking preference will not be generated in people’s 
minds. Hence, large ranking values require relatively small differences in ability or quality. In 
this sense, the draft system widely adopted in professional sports in the United States can be 
justified because it was created to maintain competitive balance.  
 
3.4.2  Culture and history 
It will be difficult to predict a priori whether any specific good or service will make some people 
feel a strong sense of ranking. Although any particular set of objects may be viewed as a valuable 
collectable item in a given society and time period, it may be perceived as worthless in other 
societies or time periods. It is therefore likely that culture and history have a significant influence 
on the generation of the sense of ranking. For example, soccer is very popular in Europe and 
South America but not in the United States. On the other hand, baseball and American football 
are very popular in the United States but not in Europe and South America. It makes sense, then, 
that soccer generates huge ranking values in Europe and South America and baseball and 
American football do not, whereas in the United States the reverse is true. Each of these sports, 
however, has a similar capacity to excite spectators. Within each region, there will be little 
difference between people’s views of the rankings. Therefore, the completely different levels of 
popularity and views of ranking values across regions can be attributed mostly to cultural and 
historical differences. 
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3.4.3  Conditions for generation of superstars  
In this section, I use the model of continuous ranking presented in Section 3.2.2 to specify the 
conditions necessary for the generation of superstars. Suppose that a household consumes only 
goods with rank 0 in period t. By equation (8), the household’s utility is  
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indicates the marginal rate of substitution between practical and ranking values. If the 
value of
0
~
RdR
qd
is large, the influence of ranking preference is large and vice versa. Whether 
superstars can be generated therefore depends on the value of
0
~
RdR
qd
.  
 If the ranking value of the goods is far larger than its practical value,
0
~
RdR
qd
will be 
very large and vice versa. Nevertheless, it seems likely that, for many goods and services, the 
practical value largely exceeds the ranking value. Hence, in many economic analyses, ranking 
preference can be assumed to be negligible; that is, 0
~
0

RdR
qd
for any R. 
 Note, on the other hand, that
0
~
RdR
qd
will not be completely zero for most goods and 
services. That is, goods and services will generally possess some ranking value even though the 
value of 
0
~
RdR
qd
may be very small.  
 
3.5  Regular revisions of rankings 
Most rankings will soon become obsolete and will need regular revision. In sports, for example, 
explicit contests are held regularly—in many cases, at fixed intervals. In the art and music 
industries, there are few explicit regularly-held contests except competitions for young artists, but 
popularity in the art and music industries certainly shifts temporally. People always collect 
information about the latest “implicit” rankings with respect to art and music through mass 
communications, websites, and word-of-mouth. In this sense, many implicit contests are held 
regularly in the fields of art and music. 
 In some cases, regular revisions of rankings will affect the strategies of producers of 
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those goods with higher ranks. Because rankings change and popularities shift regularly, 
monopolistic powers derived from ranking preferences are temporary. Producers of the goods 
with higher ranks should behave strategically with sufficient consideration of their shifting 
monopolistic powers. They should set prices for ranking value under the expectation of the length 
of period during which strong monopolistic powers can persist.  
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Superstars earn massively higher incomes than those of ordinary people, but superstars are not 
necessarily extremely more productive than ordinary people. A factor other than marginal 
productivity must play an important role to generate these extremely high relative incomes. Frank 
and Cook (1995) and Borghans and Groot (1998) commonly emphasized people’s strong 
tendency to want to obtain the best product or view the champion in various competitions, but 
they did not present a mathematical model of the mechanism generating this phenomenon. In this 
paper, I have presented a model of superstardom based on the concept of ranking value and 
ranking preference. Goods and services possess not only practical values but also ranking values 
because people derive pleasure and utility through various types of rankings. This emotional 
response (i.e., ranking preference) gives monopolistic powers to the producers of certain types of 
goods or services. For some goods and services (e.g., professional sports), households’ ranking 
preference is so strong that producers of high-rank goods or services can enjoy very strong 
monopolistic powers. I conclude that this ranking preference is the origin of the extremely high 
incomes of superstars. It is likely that each region’s or society’s culture and history have an 
important influence on the generation of ranking preference for certain goods and services.  
 As a future study, I plan to examine whether the extremely high superstar incomes that 
originate from monopolistic powers can be justified from the point of view of income inequality. 
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